We study a repeated game with asymmetric information about a dynamic state of nature. In the course of the game, the better-informed player can communicate some or all of his information to the other. Our model covers costly and/or bounded communication. We characterize the set of equilibrium payoffs and contrast these with the communication equilibrium payoffs, which by definition entail no communication costs.
1. INTRODUCTION COMMUNICATION ACTIVITIES may resolve inefficiencies due to information asymmetries between agents, but are themselves costly, e.g., due to sending and processing costs. The study of optimal trade-offs between the costs and the benefits of communication is to a large extent an open problem and is the topic of this paper.
Communication equilibria, as proposed by Forges (1986) and Myerson (1986) , extend the rules of a game by adding communication possibilities through arbitrary mechanisms at any stage of a multistage game. This concept captures the largest set of implementable equilibria when no restriction exists on the means of communication between the players.
On the other hand, economic studies like Radner (1993) tell us that in an organization like a firm, communication is a costly activity and that a significant amount of resources is devoted to processing and sending information. In these structures, the constant need for information updating entails important costs.
Starting with Forges (1990) and Bárány (1992) , a body of literature, including Urbano and Vila (2002) , Ben-Porath (2003) , and Gerardi (2004) , studies models of decentralized communication. An important conclusion of this literature is that-under various assumptions-all communication equilibria can be implemented through preplay decentralized communication procedures. Hence, decentralized communication schemes can be used without any loss of efficiency if we consider that a finite number of communication stages entails negligible costs compared to the payoffs of the game to be played. Because the costs of communication cannot be explained by considering decentralized communication schemes as opposed to centralized ones, another archetype of costly communication is needed to study the trade-off between the costs and benefits of information transmission. This paper puts the emphasis on this need for information updating, and studies the communication dynamics in a model where the states of nature evolve through time. One player-the forecaster-has better information than the other player-the agent-about the stream of states of nature. The forecaster may choose to send messages and take actions at any stage, and both components are described as part of the action set of the forecaster.
The payoffs associated to action choices and the limited action set of the forecaster model the costs associated to, and the limitations on, both information processing by the agent and the forecaster and information transmission (e.g., through physical or electronic means).
A repeated game takes place between the forecaster, the agent, and nature. The agent's actions at any stage may depend on all past actions and on all past states of nature. The forecaster's actions may depend on all past actions and on all past states of nature, but also on all future states of nature. Hence, the forecaster's actions include a payoff component (because these actions impact players' payoffs) and an information component (because these actions may inform the agent about future states of nature). At each stage, the agent updates his information using his observation both of the current state of nature and of the forecaster's action.
A specification of players' strategies induces a joint dynamic on the triple (state of nature, forecaster's action, agent's action), called the action triple. We study this dynamic through the average distribution Q of this action triple. This distribution contains all expected time average statistics of action triples and is important for strategic purposes because all expected average payoffs depend on players' strategies through it only.
We characterize the set of distributions Q that are implementable by strategies of the forecaster and the agent. The fact that the information used by the agent cannot exceed the information received leads to an informationtheoretic inequality expressed using the Shannon (1948) entropy function, which we call the information constraint.
On the one hand, we prove that for all strategies of the forecaster and the agent and for any n, the average distribution during the first n stages fulfills the information constraint. On the other hand, we prove that for any distribution Q that fulfills the information constraint, there exists a pair of pure strategies for the forecaster and the agent such that the long-run average distribution of action triples is Q. Hence, the information constraint fully characterizes the set of implementable distributions.
This result has many implications on the optimal use of communication resources, in both team games and general games.
The cost of communication inefficiencies can be measured in team games, where the (unique) Pareto payoff for the team is the natural solution concept. In the communication equilibrium extension of our model, this Pareto payoff corresponds to the first-best payoff in which both players are perfectly informed of the state of nature at each stage. In our game, the Pareto payoff is, in general, strictly less than this first-best payoff and represents a secondbest payoff that takes into account the implementation costs of communication processes. Our analysis allows us to compute the optimal payoff and to design optimal strategies for the team that take into account the communication costs and limitations.
In general games, we characterize the set of equilibrium payoffs when players are sufficiently patient. This set is a subset of the set of extensive-form communication equilibrium payoffs, which assume costless and unbounded communication, and it is a superset of the set of "silent" equilibrium payoffs in which no information is transmitted from the forecaster to the agent.
Section 2 presents the model and defines and presents elementary properties of implementable distributions. Section 3 introduces the information constraint and the main results. In Section 4 we show that using mixed or correlated strategies (instead of pure strategies) does not change the analysis. The main results are proved in Sections 5 and 7. Section 6 presents a formulation of the information constraint in terms of relative sizes of sets, which is a fundamental tool in the construction of optimal communication schemes. Section 8 presents applications to team games and to general games, and we conclude with a discussion and extensions in Section 9.
THE MODEL
We present here the basic version of our model. Most of its assumptions are relaxed in Section 9.
Given a finite set A, ∆(A) represents the set of probability measures over A and |A| is the cardinality of A. Random variables are denoted by bold letters.
The finite set of states of nature is denoted by I. There are two players: the forecaster, with finite action set J, and the agent, with finite action set K. The stage payoff functions are g f g a : I × J × K → R for the forecaster and for the agent, respectively, and g = (g f g a ). We assume |J| ≥ 2 so that possibilities of communication from the forecaster to the agent exist.
In the repeated game, the forecaster is informed beforehand of future states of nature. At each stage, the chosen action may depend on past actions, as well as on the sequence of states of nature. A (pure) strategy for the forecaster is thus a sequence (σ t ) t of mappings σ t : I N × J t−1 × K t−1 → J, where σ t describes the behavior at stage t.
The agent is informed of past realizations of nature and past actions only. A (pure) strategy for the agent is thus a sequence (τ t ) t of mappings τ t : I t−1 × J t−1 × K t−1 → K, where τ t describes the behavior at stage t. We assume that the sequence (i t ) t of states of nature is independent and identically distributed of stage law µ. A pair of strategies (σ τ) induces sequences of random variables (j t ) t and (k t ) t given by j t = σ t ((i t ) t (j 1 j t−1 ) (k 1 k t−1 )) and k t = τ t ((i 1 i t−1 ) (j 1 j t−1 ) (k 1 k t−1 )). We denote the induced probability distribution over (I × J × K)
N by P µ σ τ , and the marginal over stage t's action triple by P t µ σ τ . The average distribution up to stage t is Q t µ σ τ = 1 t t t =1 P t µ σ τ . We say that a distribution Q ∈ ∆(I × J × K) is implementable (respectively, t-implementable) when there exists a strategy pair (σ τ) such that Q t µ σ τ → Q as t → ∞ (respectively, Q t µ σ τ = Q) and in this case the strategy pair (σ τ) implements (respectively, t-implements) the distribution Q.
The set of implementable (respectively, t-implementable) distributions is denoted Q (respectively, Q(t)). Note the following elementary properties of implementable distributions.
Q(t) ⊆ Q(s + t) and thus also Q(t) ⊆ Q(kt).
(iv) The Hausdorff distance between Q(s) and Q(s + t) is bounded by 2t s+t . These elementary properties imply the following statements: REMARK 2: (i) The limit of Q(t) as t → ∞ exists and equals the closed convex hull of t≥1 Q(t).
(ii) Q(t) → Q as t → ∞.
(iii) Q is closed and convex.
Let F t (respectively F ) denote the set of feasible payoff vectors of the t-stage game (respectively, of the infinitely repeated game). Note that F t and F are the linear images of Q(t) and Q under the expectation operator: v ∈ F t if and only if there is Q ∈ Q(t) such that v = E Q g, and v ∈ F if and only if there is Q ∈ Q such that v = E Q g.
Interstage-time-dependent discount factors (λ t ) t≥1 lead to a weighted average valuation of a stream of payoffs (g t ) given by ∞ t=1 θ t g t , where θ t = ( s<t λ s )/( ∞ u=1 s<u λ s ). Thus θ = (θ t ) t≥1 is a nonincreasing sequence with ∞ t=1 θ t = 1. The valuation in the commonly used λ-discounted game for some 0 < λ < 1 corresponds to the case where θ t = (1 − λ)λ t−1 , and the valuation in the T -stage finitely repeated game corresponds to the case where θ t = 1 T for t ≤ T and θ t = 0 for t > T .
Long games are characterized by values of θ 1 close to 0. At any stage t, θ t is the weight of the current payoff, whereas t >t θ t is the weight of the future stream of payoffs. Patient players are characterized by values of sup t (θ t / t >t θ t ) close to 0.
We let E θ denote the set of Nash equilibria of the game with payoffs evaluated according to the sequence θ = (θ t ) t . The key to characterize the limit of E θ when players are sufficiently patient (Proposition 5) is a characterization via the set of implementable distributions of the set of feasible payoff vectors (Corollary 1).
Example: Coordination with Nature
We consider a two-player team game in which both players wish to coordinate with nature. I = J = K = {0 1} and µ is uniform. The common payoff function to both players is given by . Now consider the strategy of the forecaster that matches nature at even stages and plays the next state of nature at odd ones. At even stages, the agent is informed of the state of nature by the previous action of the forecaster and thus can match it. At odd stages, the agent has no information on the state of nature and we assume he plays randomly. The distribution of action triples at odd stages is The agent's actions in each block are either (0 0 0) or (1 1 1). We design strategies such that in each block after the first, the agent's actions match the state of nature in a majority of stages.
The forecaster's actions in a block signal to the agent the majoritarian state of nature in the next block. This signaling is achieved by playing the majoritarian state of nature of the block r + 1 in a singled-out stage of block r.
If the actions of the agent match the states of nature at all stages of block r (x[r] = z[r]), then the third stage of the block is the one singled out. If the actions of the agent match the sequence of states of nature in exactly two out of three stages, the mismatched stage is the one singled out. ), is implementable. Moreover, our analysis enables us to compute the (unique) implementable distribution that maximizes the corresponding payoff and to construct strategies that implement this distribution. The unique payoff-maximizing implementable distribution is x 2 i = 1 with x satisfying H(x) + (1 − x) log 2 3 = 1, where H is the entropy function.
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The corresponding payoff is x, which is approximately 0 81.
THE INFORMATION CONSTRAINT
The entropy of a discrete random variable x of law p with values in X measures its randomness and also the quantity of information given by its observation. Its value is
where the logarithm is taken in basis 2 and 0 log 0 = 0 by convention.
If x y is a pair of discrete random variables of joint law p and with values in X × Y , the entropy of x given y measures the randomness of x given the knowledge of y or, equivalently, the quantity of information yielded by the observation of x to an agent who knows y. Its value is
When we need to specify explicitly the probability Q of the probability space under which the random variables x and y are defined, we shall use the notation H Q (x) and H Q (x|y).
The main property of additivity of entropies states that
Let Q be a distribution over I × J × K. We say that Q fulfills the information constraint when
Using the additivity of entropies, the information constraint can be rewritten as
The left-hand side of this inequality can be interpreted as the amount of information received by the agent who observes the forecaster's action j, given the observation of the state of nature i and his own action k. It is then an amount of information sent by the forecaster to the agent.
The right-hand side of (2) is the difference between the randomness of i and the randomness of i given the knowledge of k. It is thus the reduction of uncertainty that k gives on i, or the amount of information yielded by i on k. We interpret it as an amount of information used by the agent on the state of nature.
Following this interpretation, the information constraint expresses the fact that the information used by the agent cannot exceed the information received from the forecaster.
Other expressions of the information constraint, such as The next result shows a converse of the previous theorem when the horizon of the game is large.
THEOREM 2: Any distribution that fulfills the information constraint and has marginal µ on I is implementable.
Together, Theorems 1 and 2 show that the information constraint fully characterizes the set of implementable distributions. It also characterizes the set of feasible payoff vectors as follows:
COROLLARY 1: A payoff vector v is feasible if and only if there exists a distribution Q that fulfills the information constraint and has marginal µ on
I such that v = E Q g.
Example Continued
Consider the game of Section 2.1. For 0 < y < 1, the distribution D y of action triples is The value of the entropy function H(x), 0 < x < 1, is a good approximation of 1 n log n xn for large n. Hence, H(0 8) + 0 2 log 3 > H(i) = 1 implies 5n n 3 n > 2 5n for n sufficiently large and precise computation shows that this holds for all n ≥ 17.
The left-hand side of this inequality, 5n n 3 n , is the number of elements in the set S(n) of all sequences of length 5n of the digits {1 2 3 4}, where exactly 4n of the entries are 1. Define a 1-1 map τ from K 5n = {0 1} 5n into S(n). Note that for 1 < r < m we have |{1 ≤ t ≤ 5n :
and, therefore, 4n(m + 1/2) ≥ |{1 ≤ t ≤ 5nm : x t = y t = z t }| ≥ 4n(m − 1), and thus for sufficiently large m, the average payoff 1 5nm |{1 ≤ t ≤ 5nm : x t = y t = z t }| is close to 0 8. In addition, Q(i = 0 = j = k), Q(i = 0 = k = j), etc., are close to 1/30.
MIXED AND CORRELATED STRATEGIES
The set of t-implementable distributions in pure or mixed strategies is not convex whenever |K| ≥ 2, and its convex hull is the set of t-implementable distributions in correlated strategies. However, the set of implementable distributions is closed and convex (Remark 2), and therefore also contains the t-implementable distributions in correlated strategies and their limits. Thus, t-implementable distributions using correlated strategies fulfill the information constraint, and distributions that are implementable using correlated strategies are also implementable using pure strategies.
The convexity and the closedness of the set of implementable distributions also follow from Theorems 1 and 2 and from the following lemma, which is useful in the sequel.
LEMMA 1: Given finite sets X and Y , the function Q → H Q (y|x) is concave on the set of probability measures on X × Y .
PROOF: The proof follows from the concavity of entropy. LetQ = m λ m Q m be a finite convex combination of distributions over X × Y . Consider a triple of random variables α β γ such that P(γ = m) = λ m and α β has law Q m conditional on γ = m. Then
Q.E.D.
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
For any pure strategies σ and τ, and any stage t,
where the first inequality follows from the fact that k t is a deterministic function of the past,
; the second inequality follows from the fact that (i 1 i t ) is a function of (i 1 j 1 k 1 i t−1 j t−1 k t−1 ). By Lemma 1,
Hence t-implementable distributions fulfill the information constraint. The result follows from the fact that the maps Q → H Q (i j|k) and Q → H Q (i) are continuous and, therefore, the set of distributions Q that obey the information constraint is closed.
A COMBINATORIAL VIEW OF THE INFORMATION CONSTRAINT
The entropy of the uniform distribution on a finite set A is called the combinatorial entropy of A and is denoted H(A); it is the log to the base two of the number of elements of A. An inequality between the combinatorial entropy of two finite sets is thus an inequality between the number of elements of the sets and vice versa. In this section we derive a fundamental inequality, (5), that enables us to translate the information constraint, which is an inequality of entropies, to an approximate inequality of combinatorial entropies.
Comparison of sizes of sets and, in particular, inequalities derived from (5), play a fundamental role in the proof of Theorem 2. Indeed, if a set A is larger than another set B, then by pointing to an element in A, the forecaster can signal to the agent which element of B to choose. In addition, the present section introduces notations used in the proof of Theorem 2.
For a finite sequence β = (b 1 b n ) over a finite alphabet B, ρ(β) ∈ ∆(B) denotes its empirical distribution (ρ(β)[b] = 1 n n t=1 I bt =b ) and for ν ∈ ∆(B), T n (ν) denotes the n-type set of ν, {β ∈ B n : ρ(β) = ν}. The set of types is T n (B) = {µ ∈ ∆(B) T n (µ) = ∅}.
The entropy function provides a good approximation of the combinatorial entropy of a nonempty typical set T n (ν) (see, for instance, Cover and Thomas (1991, Theorem 12.1.3, p. 282) 
If ν ∈ ∆(A × B) has marginals ν A ∈ ∆(A) on A and ν B on B, and α = (a 1 a n ) ∈ T n (ν A ), the n-type set of ν conditional on α, denoted T n (ν|α), is the set of elements in T n (ν) whose A-coordinates coincide with α; equivalently, T n (ν|α) is identified with {β ∈ T n (ν B ) : (α β) ∈ T n (ν)}, where for β = (b 1 b n ), (α β) := (a 1 b 1 a n b n ). The number of elements of T n (ν|α) is independent of α ∈ T n (ν A ) and |T n (ν|α)||T n (ν α )| = |T n (ν)|; equivalently, H(T n (ν|α)) + H(T n (ν α )) = H(T n (ν)). The last equality is termed the additivity of combinatorial entropies.
The conditional entropy H ν (b|a) = H(ν) − H(ν A ) (where ν ∈ T n (A × B)) provides a good approximation of the combinatorial entropy of the typical set T n (ν|α). If ν ∈ T n (A × B) and α ∈ T n (ν A ), using the additivity of combinatorial entropies, inequality (3) implies that (n + 1)
(n+1) |A×B| . Using Lemma 2 (in the Appendix), we have the tighter inequality
, and set q(n) = n |I×J×K| . The inequalities (3) and (4) imply (assuming n |I| > 1) that for x ∈ T n (Q I ), we have
Now we apply the inequality (5) to rewrite the information constraint as an approximate inequality of combinatorial entropies.
The following conditions on a distribution Q ∈ ∆(I×J×K) are equivalent:
(i) Q fulfills the information constraint.
(ii) There exists B ∈ R such that for x ∈ T n (Q n I ), we have
We first prove that (i) and (ii) are equivalent. Assume that Q fulfills the information constraint. Thus
In fact, the right-hand inequality holds for q(n) ≥ ( n+|I| |I×J×K| )
|I×J×K| and the left-hand inequality holds for q(n) ≥ (n + 1) |K| and thus, in particular, the inequalities hold for q(n) ≥ n |I×J×K| .
K|) and |H
and thus, by using inequality (5), for x ∈ T n (Q n I ), we have H(T n (Q n |x)) ≥ H(T n (Q n K )) − 6C log 2 n − log 2 q(n) and thus (6) holds with B = −6C − |I × J × K|.
If Q violates the information constraint, then H Q (i j|k) − H Q (k) < 0. Therefore, there is δ > 0 such that for sufficiently large n we have H Q n (i j|k) ≤ H Q n (k) − δ and thus, by using inequality (5), for x ∈ T n (Q n I ) and n sufficiently large we have H(T n (Q n |x)) ≤ H(T n (Q n K )) − δn + log 2 q(n). Therefore, there is no B ∈ R for which inequality (6) holds for all n.
From the additivity of entropies, inequality (6) is equivalent to the inequality in condition (iii).
Now we derive consequences of inequality (5) that are used in the proof of
Inequality (5) implies that if ε > 0 and n is sufficiently large so that 2 εn > q(n), then
As shown in Section 7.1, for sufficiently large values 5 of n, the set T n (Q K ) is one of many subsets A of T n (Q K ) with
The two terms that appear in inequality (8) have relevant interpretations for the online communication problem between the forecaster and the agent. The intersection T n (Q|x) ∩ (J n × A) is the set of points (y z) ∈ (J × K) n with z ∈ A and (x y z) ∈ T n (Q). Given x ∈ T n (Q I ), T n (Q|x) ∩ (J n × A) can be interpreted as a set of messages (y z) ∈ (J × K) n subject to z ∈ A and (x y z) ∈ T n (Q). The set A can be interpreted as a target set of action strings of length n of the agent.
Therefore, given x ∈ T n (Q I ), there is a 1-
, and a point in η(A) can be interpreted as a message for the selection of an element of A.
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Fix Q ∈ ∆(I × J × K) that satisfies the conditions of Theorem 2. By Remark 2, the set of implementable distributions is closed and by Remark 1, it contains Q(t). Therefore, it suffices to prove that for every ε > 0 there exists a strategy profile (σ τ) and t = t(ε σ τ) such that Q t µ σ τ − Q < ε Fix ε > 0. By Lemma 4 (in the Appendix) there is Q ∈ ∆(I × J × K) such that T n (Q) = ∅, Q − Q < 7ε and thus in particular Q I − µ < 7ε (9) and
Let n > |I| 2 /ε 3 be a fixed sufficiently large integer; e.g., 2 εn > n |I×J×K| (2 + 2n ln |I|) suffices. The proof associates (given n and Q specified previously) to each sequence x = (x 1 x 2 ) of states of nature two sequences y = (y 1 y 2 ) and z = (z 1 z 2 ) of forecaster's actions and agent's actions, respectively.
The stages are partitioned into consecutive blocks: the first block is of length n 1 ≥ n log |K| (≥ nH(Q K )), where n 1 is a multiple of n, and the other blocks are of length n. Set n 0 = 0 and n r = n 1 + (r − 1)n for r ≥ 1. We construct the sequences y and z as follows. Denote by
(where 1 ≤ t ≤ n 1 for r = 1 and 1 ≤ t ≤ n for r > 1) the action triples in the rth block (i.e., in stages n r−1 < s ≤ n r ).
We choose for every x ∈ I¯n, wheren is either n 1 or n, an elementx ∈ Tn(Q I ) that minimizes the number of coordinates 1 ≤ t ≤n with x t =x t subject to ρ(x 1 x n ) = Q I . Let A ⊂ T n (Q K ) satisfy (8). Then, for everyx ∈ T n (Q I ), there is a 1-1 map fx from A into the set of all pairs (y z) ∈ T n (Q|x) ∩ (J n × A). As |A| ≤ |T n (Q K )| ≤ 2 n 1 , there is a 1-1 map f 0 from A into J n 1 . Thus, by backward induction, starting at r = m, there are sequences Let Q nm µ (respectively,Q nm µ ) be the expectation of the empirical distribution of the triples (x t y t z t ) (respectively, (x t y t z t )), where 1 ≤ t ≤ n m and x = (x 1 x 2 ) is an independent and identically distributed sequence with x t ∼ µ. Now we prove that condition (i) above implies that for sufficiently large m we have Q nm µ − Q < 26ε. For 1 < r ≤ m, the norm distance between the empirical distribution of ( 
µ − Q < ε and, therefore, by the triangle inequality, we conclude that for sufficiently large m we have Q nm µ − Q < (18 + 1 + 7)ε = 26ε. This ends the proof of Theorem 2. We end this section with a discussion on the construction of the strategies of the proof.
Choice of the Action Plan
The proof of Theorem 2 relies on a set A of action plans for the forecaster (e.g., T n (Q K )) that satisfies inequality (8).
Let g(n) = 2 + 2n ln |I| and 1 ≤ f n ≤ |T n (Q I×K )|/|T n (Q I )|. Then f n (g(n) − 1) 2 /(2g(n)) > nH(Q I ) ln 2 and, by Lemma 3 (in the Appendix), there is a subset A of T n (Q K ) with
such that 6 for every x ∈ T n (Q I ) there are at least f n elements z ∈ A such that (x z) ∈ T n (Q I×K ), i.e., |T n (Q I×K |x) ∩ A| ≥ f n . Thus, for every x ∈ T n (Q I ) we have
Therefore, if ε > 0 and n is sufficiently large so that 2 εn > q(n)g(n), then A obeys (8).
The combinatorial entropy of A is
Hence, the construction of the proof can be implemented using sets of action plans with combinatorial entropies that equal cn + O(log n), where c is any value between H Q (k) + H Q (i) − H Q (i k) and H Q (k).
It is worthwhile to note that the implementable strategies described above require a perfect forecast of n + n 1 stages when f n = 1 and n 1 − n + nm stages when f n = |T n (Q I×K )|/|T n (Q I )|. Moreover, when f n = 1, the first block can be replaced with a block of size n and thus a forecast of 2n stages is required. The strategy that corresponds to the minimal value f n = 1 thus requires a smaller forecast and, in addition, a smaller dictionary (a function f x from T n (Q|x) ∩ (J n × A) onto A) to specify the agent's action in the forthcoming block as a function of the sequence of action triples in the last block. As f n increases, the size of the dictionary increases. However, at the other extreme, when f n = |T n (Q I×K )|/|T n (Q I )| the set A is simply T n (Q K ) and thus the construction of the set A is made explicit.
An adequate choice of size for the set A may also prove useful in the study of the rate of convergence of the set of t-implementable distributions or the set of distributions implementable with finite forecasts to the full set of implementable distributions.
PAYOFFS AND EQUILIBRIA
In this section we show how, for sufficiently long games, the information constraint yields characterizations of (i) the set of feasible payoff vectors, (ii) the best payoff a team can achieve, and (iii) the set of equilibrium payoffs when players are sufficiently patient.
Feasible Payoffs
We show that the set F is a good approximation for the set of feasible payoffs of the long games.
The approximation applies to general interstage-time-dependent discounting, thus, in particular, to finite repetitions of the game as well as to interstagetime-independent discounting.
For a nonincreasing sequence θ = (θ t ) t of nonnegative numbers that sum to 1, let Q θ µ σ τ = ∞ t=1 θ t P t µ σ τ be the θ-weighted average distribution of action triples. The expectation of the θ-weighted sum of the stage payoffs is
is a convex combination of the family of distributions {Q t µ σ τ } t≥1 . Thus it obeys the information constraint and has marginal µ on I. Therefore, if Σ f and Σ a denote the sets of strategies of the forecaster and the agent, respectively, we have PROPOSITION 2: For every nonincreasing sequence θ = (θ t ) that sums to 1, the set of θ-weighted feasible payoff vectors
Recall that F t is the set of feasible payoff vectors of the t-stage repeated game and let F λ denote the set of feasible payoff vectors of the λ-discounted game. Special cases of the previous proposition are
On the other hand, if Q is implementable, there exists a strategy pair (σ τ) such that for every ε > 0 there exists N so that Q n µ σ τ − Q < ε for every n ≥ N. Therefore, if θ = (θ t ) t is a nonincreasing sequence that sums to 1, then Q θ µ σ τ − Q = ∞ t=1 (θ t − θ t+1 )t(Q t µ σ τ − Q) ≤ 2Nθ 1 + ε (by the triangle inequality and using 0 ≤ N t=1 (θ t − θ t+1 )t = N t=1 θ t − Nθ N+1 ≤ Nθ 1 ) and, therefore, for sufficiently small θ 1 , the distribution Q θ µ σ τ is within 2ε of the distribution Q. Therefore: PROPOSITION 3: F θ converges in the Hausdorff metric to F as θ 1 goes to 0. In particular, F λ → F as λ → 1 and F t → F as T → ∞.
Team Games
Team games, in which players' preferences are identical, form an adequate setup for the study of inefficiencies due to information asymmetries and communication costs. As shown, for instance, by Marschak and Radner (1972) and by Arrow (1985) , it is helpful to describe a firm as a team when one focuses on the question of information transmission among its members.
In team games, our model allows us to measure the inefficiencies that arise from the need to send and process information. As a benchmark, consider the situation in which both the agent and the forecaster have complete information about the states of nature. In this case, it is possible for both players to choose optimally an action pair at each stage given the current state of nature. The corresponding expected payoff is the best feasible under complete information.
In the game we analyze, both players can use a myopic behavior that seeks to maximize at each stage the payoff of the current stage. In this case, the forecaster's actions are uninformative about the future of the process, and so the agent's belief on the current state of nature is his prior belief. Such behavior rules are not optimal in general. Indeed, in most games the team can secure a better payoff if the forecaster deviates from a myopic maximization rule so as to convey information to the agent. For instance, in the game of Section 2.1, myopic behaviors cannot secure more than 1 2 , whereas the nonmyopic strategies that implement the distribution D 1 guarantee 5 8 .
As we see, a good joint behavior for the forecaster must seek to communicate maximal information with the slightest deviation from a stage payoff maximization rule.
The problems of finding optimal strategies for the team and of computing the maximal payoffs that can be achieved in a T -stage game or in a λ-discounted game are difficult. Yet these problems are made particularly simple by considering long repeated games and using an approach through the information constraint.
Let v θ be the maximum payoff for the team when the discount factors are given by θ = (θ t ) t , i.e., v θ = max{x : (x x) ∈ F θ }, and let v = max{x : (x x) ∈ F}. Proposition 2 implies that v θ ≤ v and Proposition 3 implies PROPOSITION 4: v θ goes to v when θ 1 goes to 0. In particular, the maximal payoffs that can be achieved in T -stage games and in λ-discounted games go to v as λ goes to 1 and T goes to ∞.
We are thus able to characterize the best feasible payoff to the team and its degree of inefficiency compared to the full information case, and to construct strategies that achieve this maximal payoff.
Our model thus applies to the study of the impact of communication costs on team games, which is an important question in the theory of organizations (see van Zandt (1999) for a survey). The information constraint does not depend on the specification of payoffs to the team. Because it characterizes the set of implementable distributions, it allows us to write the maximization problem faced by the team in a simple and compact way for any payoff specification.
Example: bounded communication
Consider the following team game where the state of nature specifies the matrix, the forecaster is the row player, and the agent is the column player. The sequence of states of nature follows an independent and identically distributed Messages do not affect payoffs, but given µ and the size of J, it is not possible to send all the relevant information to the agent. A choice then needs to be made about what information is to be sent, such that only the most important information reaches the agent. This models cheap but bounded communication capacities. For instance, such a situation occurs when either the forecaster or the agent is only capable of processing one binary message per stage.
We illustrate the use of the information constraint in computing the maximal payoff that the team of the forecaster and the agent can obtain. Let Q be an implementable distribution that maximizes the common payoff; i.e., the distribution Q maximizes the probability Q(i = k) subject to H Q (i j|k) ≥ H Q (i). Obviously, by replacing the distribution Q with the product distribution of the uniform distribution U J on J and the marginal distribution Q I×K , we obtain a distributionQ withQ(i = k) = Q(i = k) and HQ(i j|k) ≥ HQ(i). Therefore, we can assume without loss of generality that Q is the product distribution U J ⊗ Q I×K and thus the information constraint is 1 + H Q (i|k) ≥ H Q (i) = log 3 i.e.,
Note that the common payoff depends only on the values of Q(i = k = 1), Q(i = k = 2), and Q(i = k = 3), and equals their sum. By symmetry and by concavity of the map Q → H Q (i|k) (Lemma 1), we can assume without loss of generality that
Given this inequality, the conditional entropy H Q (i|k) is maximized when
and thus H Q (i|k) = H(3x) + 1 − 3x, which implies that the maximal payoff is the solution v of the equation H(x) + (1 − x) = log 3 2 . Numerically, v ∼ 0 896. This has to be compared with the maximal payoff of 1 3 when the agent is kept uninformed, and with the payoff of 1 when the agent is fully informed.
It follows from the analysis in the next subsection that the set of equilibrium payoffs of the repeated game when players are sufficiently patient goes to the set {(y y) : 1 3 ≤ y ≤ v} of all individual rational and feasible payoff vectors.
Games with Different Interests
Now we consider general payoff functions g = (g f g a ). We compare the set of equilibrium payoffs of our model with the set of silent equilibrium payoffs in which no information is transmitted and with the set of communication equilibrium payoffs.
Call a strategy of the forecaster silent if it depends only on past play and on the current state of nature (hence not on future states of nature). When the forecaster uses silent strategies and the agent uses arbitrary strategies, the induced set of feasible payoff vectors is the set of silent feasible payoff vectors given by
where co stands for the convex hull. At the other extreme, the set of feasible payoff vectors in the extensive-form or normal-form communication extension of the game is
Finally, define the set of feasible payoff vectors with internal communication as F and recall that F = {E Q g(i j k) : Q verifies the information constraint and Q I = µ}
We have the obvious inclusions
Because the set F is closed and convex (as the image of the closed and convex set Q by the linear expectation operator), it is defined by its support function
where x y stands for the inner product of x and y. Given x ∈ R 2 , the value max y∈F x y of the support function equals the maximal payoff that the team of the forecaster and the agent can achieve in the team game where the common payoff function equals the inner product x (g f (i j k) g a (i j k)) . Therefore, computing the feasible set F amounts to solving a family of (two-person) 7 team games.
The individually rational level of a player is defined as the best payoff that this player can defend using mixed strategies against every strategy of the other player in long repetitions of the game. For the forecaster, this payoff is
For the agent, this payoff is
The situation is asymmetric between the two players. Indeed, the forecaster possesses a double advantage over the agent. First, he can use his private information concerning the states of nature to defend a better payoff against the agent, which results in a higher individually rational level for the forecaster. Second, he can use this information against the agent when punishing him, which induces a lower individually rational payoff for the agent. Let IR be the set of individually rational payoff vectors:
The set F S ∩ IR corresponds to the set of equilibrium payoffs of games with sufficiently patient players in which the forecaster uses silent strategies that may depend on the current state of nature, but not on future ones. In these equilibria, the agent is uninformed as to future states of nature.
The set F C ∩ IR is the set of communication equilibrium payoffs of the repeated game with sufficiently patient players. In this case, there are neither restrictions nor costs associated with the communication possibilities.
Finally, F ∩ IR is the set of equilibrium payoffs of our original game when players are sufficiently patient and all communication is internal to the game. Formally:
In fact, as the implementing strategies in our proof are pure, it follows that solving a family of two-person team games suffices for computing the feasible set of payoff vectors in the model where there are several forecasters and several agents.
In particular, the set of equilibria of the λ-discounted game goes to F ∩ IR as λ goes to 1.
Note that all information concerning future states of nature that is sent by the forecaster is eventually verifiable by the agent. Therefore, the proof of the proposition is straightforward (and follows the classical lines of proofs) when the set F ∩ IR contains a point that strictly dominates the individual rational payoff vector.
Note that the limit set F ∩ IR is convex, but is in general not a polyhedron. It is computed directly from the information constraint and reflects the costs of communication among the players.
DISCUSSION AND EXTENSIONS
To preserve maximum transparency, we have tried to keep the basic model of Section 2 as simple as possible. Notably, this has led to greatly simplified assumptions on the forecasting ability, the signaling structure of the game, and the distribution of the process. The aim of this section is to present various extensions and variations of the basic model, and to show how the analysis of implementable distributions through the information constraint can be adapted to these cases. We first discuss relaxations of the perfect and infinite forecast assumption. Second, we examine the impact of the signaling structure of the one-shot game on the set of implementable distributions. Third, we show how autocorrelations of the process of states of nature can reduce the need for information transmission and expand the set of implementable distributions. Next, we illustrate that our main result is robust in the sense that small deviations from the main assumptions lead to a small change in the set of implementable distributions. Finally, we discuss the possibilities of asymmetric information on both sides as an open problem.
Limited Forecasting Abilities
The assumption of perfect and infinite forecast is relaxed in two ways. First, we can assume that the forecaster is able to make predictions on states of nature a finite number of stages in advance. Second, we introduce possibilities of inaccurate predictions.
Finite forecasts
Say that the forecaster has f forecast if, before stage t, the forecaster is informed of i t i t+f −1 . Note that any strategy that is implementable with f forecast is implementable with perfect forecast. Note also that the strategies constructed in the proof of Theorem 2 use f forecast for larger and larger values of f . Hence, the set of implementable distributions with f forecast converges, as f goes to ∞, to the implementable distributions of the basic model.
Imperfect forecasts
Now we discuss the case where the forecaster is imperfectly informed of the states of nature. Let S be a set of signals for the forecaster and let R be a transition probability from I to S. Assume that before the game starts, the forecaster observes a sequence of signals (s t ) t , where each signal s t is drawn independently according to the probability R it . Following the play at stage t, the agent observes a stochastic signal that includes the action j t of the forecaster, and the forecaster observes a stochastic signal that depends on the action triple (i t j t k t ). The basic model corresponds to the case of perfect monitoring and perfect forecasts (where S = I and R i (s) = 1 if i = s and = 0 if i = s).
In this case, a distribution Q ∈ ∆(J) × ∆(I × K) with Q I = µ is implementable if and only if there exists a distributionQ
Condition (ii) is the usual information constraint on Q. Condition (i) expresses the fact that all information players have on the current state of nature comes from the signal s of the forecaster.
If the signal to the agent, following the play at stage t, includes s t in addition to j t , then a distribution Q ∈ ∆(J × I × K) with Q I = µ is implementable if and only if there exists a distributionQ
(ii) HQ(j s|k) ≥ HQ(s).
Signaling Structures
The basic model assumes that the stage game has perfect monitoring in the sense that both the forecaster and the agent are perfectly informed of the action triple played at each stage.
As a general property, any reduction of the informational content of the signals received by the forecaster or by the agent concerning the action triple results in a reduction of the set of implementable distributions. In other words, all distributions that are implementable with less informative signals are also implementable with more informative ones. This follows from the fact that strategies in the model with less informative signals are also strategies in the model with more informative signals.
Now we discuss the effects of a change either in the forecaster's observation of the agent's action, or in the agent's observation of the forecaster's action, or in the agent's observation of the current state of nature.
In this subsection, it will be useful to use the classical information-theoretic notation I(a; b) to denote the mutual information H(a) − H(a|b) (= H(b) − H(b|a)) between two random variables a and b. We also use the notation I Q (a; b) to make explicit the dependence of I Q (a; b) on the distribution Q of (a b).
Imperfect observation of agent's actions
Assume the forecaster observes at each stage a signal on the agent's actions. The basic model corresponds to the case where this signal is fully informative. Consider the strategies constructed in the proof of Theorem 2. Because the agent uses a pure strategy, which depends on the observed past states of nature and the forecaster's actions only, and because this information is available to the forecaster, the forecaster can reconstitute the past actions of the agent even if the signal received on these actions is completely uninformative. Hence, the designed strategies can still be used. The set of implementable distributions is thus unchanged under the assumption that the forecaster has imperfect monitoring on the agent's actions.
In particular, the characterization of Proposition 4 of the limit Pareto payoff to the team for sufficiently long games (θ 1 arbitrarily close to 0) remains unchanged.
Note, however, that the set of equilibrium payoffs in the repeated games with different interests is modified. Indeed, some deviations of the agent that are detectable under perfect monitoring may become undetectable under imperfect monitoring.
Imperfect observation of forecaster's actions
Consider the situation where the agent observes the states of nature but does not have perfect monitoring of the forecaster's actions. The distribution of the signal s ∈ S depends on the triple (i j k); the conditional distribution of s given (i j k) is denoted by R i j k (∈ ∆(S)).
Given a distribution Q on I × J × K, we denote byQ the distribution on I × J × K × S with marginal Q on I × J × K and such thatQ(s|i j k) = R i j k (s). Using this notation, Q is implementable if and only if Q I = µ and
Notice that in the case of the basic model, HQ(s|i k) = H Q (j|i k) and HQ(s|i j k) = 0, and thus inequality (11) particularizes to the information constraint H Q (j|i k) ≥ I(i; k).
The two special cases of the above characterization that are considered below are reformulations of classical results in information theory: Shannon's Noisy Channel Capacity theorem (see, e.g., Cover and Thomas (1991, Theorem 8.7.1, p. 198) ) and the Rate Distortion theorem for independent and identically distributed sources (see, e.g., Cover and Thomas (1991, Theorem 13.2.1, p. 342) ).
First, consider the special case where the distribution R i j k (s) depends on j only and I = K. The information constraint (11) for a distribution Q such that Q(i = k) = 1 can be expressed as H Q (s) − H Q (s|j) = I Q (s; j) ≥ H Q (i). Note also that a distribution Q with Q(i = k) = 1 is implementable if and only if it is implementable in the variant of the model where the forecaster does not observe the actions of the agent and the agent does not observe the states of nature. Define the capacity of a stochastic signal s as the maximum over the random variable j of the mutual information I (s; j) . Thus, our result shows that there exists an implementable distribution Q such that Q(i = k) = 1 if and only if the capacity of s exceeds H(i). This result is equivalent to the classical Shannon Noisy Channel Capacity theorem for independent and identically distributed sources.
Second, assume that R i j k (s) depends on j only. The information constraint (11) for a distribution Q ∈ ∆(S) × ∆(I × K) can be expressed as IQ(s; j) ≥ I Q (i; k). Indeed, for such a product distribution Q, we have HQ(s| i k) = HQ(s) and HQ(s|i j k) = HQ(s|j). Therefore, the left-hand side of inequality (11) equals IQ(s; j). Note that IQ(s; j) depends only on Q J and I Q (i; k) depends only on Q I×K .
Fix µ ∈ ∆(I). Now assume that the payoff function does not depend on j, i.e., g(i j k) = d(i k), and let R(D) be the min of I P (i; k) when P is a distribution on I × K such that P I = µ and
Moreover, the implementability of a distribution Q ∈ ∆(J) × ∆(I × K) does not depend on the agent observing the states of nature. This generalizes the Rate Distortion theorem for independent and identically distributed sources (see, e.g., Cover and Thomas (1991, Theorem 13.2.1, p. 342) ).
Unobservable current state of nature
Now consider the case where the agent observes the forecaster's actions, but is uninformed of the current state of nature.
The characterization of the full set of implementable distributions in this case is beyond the scope of this paper. However, consider the subset R of distributions on I × J × K that are the product of a distribution on J and a distribution on I × K.
Following a similar analysis to that of our basic model, one can prove that a distribution Q ∈ R is implementable if and only if
If the agent also does not have perfect monitoring of the forecaster's actions, but receives a signal s as a function of the forecaster's action j, we proceed as in Section 9.2.2. Consider the conditional distribution of s given j by R j ∈ ∆(S). Following the same notation, we obtain that a distribution Q that is a product of a distribution on J and a distribution on I × K is implementable if and only if Q I = µ and
State of Nature Processes
Now we analyze the variant of the basic model where the states of nature follow a Markov chain. In such cases, the distribution of the state of nature in stage t + 1 is correlated to the distribution of the state in stage t. The adequate element of study is the expected long-run average Q of the distribution of the quadruple (i t−1 i t j t k t ). Let Q be a distribution on I × I × J × K and let
A Markov chain eventually enters into an ergodic class of states. As players observe past states of nature, they are eventually informed of the ergodic class entered by the chain, and it suffices to study the expected long-run average in the case of an irreducible Markov chain. Let µ be the invariant measure on I and let T denote the transition matrix of the Markov chain. The marginal on I × I of an implementable distribution Q (on I × I × J × K) is deduced from the law of the Markov chain: Q(i = i i = i) = µ(i )T i i . It turns out that a distribution Q is implementable if and only if its marginal on I × I coincides with the marginal imposed by the Markov chain transitions and
This last condition thus describes the information constraint when the process of states of nature follows a Markov chain. Now we compare the set of implementable distributions under the independent and identically distributed and the Markov assumptions. Assume that Q ∈ ∆(I × J × K) has marginal µ on I and verifies the information constraint H Q (i j|k) ≥ H Q (i) under the independent and identically distributed assumption. Let T be the transition of an irreducible Markov chain and let Q ∈ ∆(I × I × J × K) be the law of (i i j k), where (a) (i j k) have law Q.
(b) The law of (i i) is deduced from the law of the Markov chain:
Now we verify that Q verifies the information constraint under the Markov model. Indeed,
where the first and third equalities follow from (a) and (c), the first inequality follows from the information constraint verified by Q, the second inequality follows from the concavity of entropies, and the second and last equalities follow from the chain rule of entropies. The obtained inequality is then equivalent to the information constraint for Markov chains (12) applied to Q.
The information constraint is satisfied in the Markov case whenever it is in the independent and identically distributed case. This shows that the set of implementable distributions is augmented when one takes advantage of the correlations between successive states of nature. This is intuitive because in the Markov case the need for information transmission is not as important as it is in the independent and identically distributed case.
Information Banking
In the Markov chain case, the distribution of i t given the sequence of past states i 1 i t−1 is a function of i t−1 only. Let ν i be the distribution of i t given i t−1 = i. Define the random partition of N, N = N i , where N i is the set of all stages t such that i t−1 = i. For every i ∈ I and a strategy pair (σ τ) we define (for every positive integer n) the distribution Q i n σ τ as the expected empirical distribution of action triples in stages t ∈ N i with t ≤ n. The marginal on I of the distribution Q i n σ τ is ν i . Our proof (of the result of the basic model) implies that if Q i ∈ ∆(I × J × K) verifies the information constraint and has marginal ν i on I, and µ is the invariant distribution of the Markov chain, then the distribution Q = i µ(i)Q i is implementable. Indeed, by considering the states in each N i separately, the team can collate the strategies that implement Q i to a strategy pair (σ τ) in the Markov chain games so that Q i n σ τ converges to Q i and, thus, as
Now we verify that the distribution Q on I × I × J × K, defined as Q (i i j k) = µ(i )Q i (i j k) (and, therefore, Q I×J×K = i µ(i)Q i ), verifies the information constraint under the Markov chain model.
Our characterization of the implementable distribution in the Markov chain process implies, however, additional implementable distributions. For any real number α, say that a distribution Q on I × J × K obeys the α-information constraint if H Q (i j|k) ≥ H Q (i) + α. Note that α can be positive, negative, or zero. The characterization of implementable distributions by the information constraint (12) implies that Q is implementable if and only if there are distributions Q i ∈ ∆(I × J × K) with marginals ((Q i ) I =) ν i on I and constants α i such that (i) Q i obeys the α i -information constraint, (ii) i µ(i)Q i = Q, and (iii) i µ(i)a i = 0.
This comparison of the Markov chain and the independent and identically distributed cases highlights the need for the forecaster to signal at stages t ∈ N i on states of nature in stages t ∈ N i where i = i .
Robustness
The analysis of the previous extensions demonstrates (indirectly) the robustness of our main results to some departures in the assumptions made either on the state of nature process, or on the foresight ability of the forecaster, or on the monitoring and forecasting possibilities of the agent. We wish to comment on robustness when all assumptions are perturbed together and to allow for a wide variety of perturbations. To do this, we introduce a generalized version of our model.
We start by describing the dynamics of the states of nature and the signaling structure of the game. A point ω = (i 1 i 2 ) ∈ I ∞ is chosen by nature according to some distribution P. Before the game starts, player n (n = 1 2 in the two-player game) observes a random signal s n 0 whose distribution depends on the sequence ω. At stage t, player 1 takes an action j t ∈ J and player 2 takes an action k t ∈ K. Following the play at stage t, player n observes the realization of a random signal 8 s n t , where the conditional distribution of (s A strategy of player 1 (respectively, player 2) specifies the action j t (respectively, k t ) at stage t as a function of all his past information, namely, as a function of s 1 0
To quantify a small perturbation in this general model, we introduce a proper definition to measure such perturbation. First, the stochastic process (I ∞ P) is within δ of an independent and identically distributed process if there exists µ ∈ ∆(I) and probability distributionsP[n] on (I × I ) m , where I is a copy of I and m = [δ −2 ], such that (i n+1 i n+m ) has distribution µ ⊗m , the projection ofP[n] on the m I-coordinates coincides with P, i.e.,P[n] I n (i n+1 i n+m ) = P(i n+1 i n+m |i 1 i n ), and ∀ sufficiently large n 8 In fact, we can assume without loss of generality that the signals are, moreover, deterministic. Indeed, we can "push" all randomness into I; this will, however, require an infinite set of states.
An example of a process (with values in I N ) that is within δ of an independent and identically distributed process is a nonstationary Markov chain (i.e., with time-dependent transitions), where the probabilities T t (i i) of transition at stage t from state i to state i obey i∈I |T t (i i) − µ(i)| < δ for all sufficiently large t.
Second, we say that the forecaster has δ-perfect foresight if, for all sufficiently large t, the forecaster can guess the future m : ∀ sufficiently large t
The agent has δ-forecast if, for every t ≥ 1, every ω = (i 1 i 2 ) and ω = (i 1 i 2 ) (in I ∞ ) with (i 1 i t ) = (i 1 i t ), and every (j t k t ) ∈ J × K, the distribution of s 2 t given (ω j t k t ) is within 9 δ of its distribution given (ω j t k t ).
Finally, we say that the game model Γ is δ-close to the basic model Γ if the process of states of nature is within δ of the independent and identically distributed µ ⊗N , the forecaster has δ-perfect foresight, and the agent has δ-perfect monitoring and δ-forecast.
The robustness theorem states that the set of implementable distributions of a small perturbation of one instance of the basic model is close to the set of implementable distributions of that instance. Formally: THEOREM 3-The Robustness Theorem: Let Γ be a basic model game. For every ε > 0 there is δ > 0 such that if Γ is δ-close to Γ , then the set of implementable distributions of Γ are within ε of the set of implementable distributions of Γ .
Observe that the basic model is the special case where s 1 0 (ω) = ω, s 2 0 (ω) is a constant independent of ω, and s n (i t j t k t ) = (i t j t k t ). The classical model of 9 If the signal s a t takes values in a finite set S a , then we can use the norm distance between distributions; in the general case we refer to the Kullback-Leibler distance.
repeated games with incomplete information is the special case where i t = i t+1 for all t and s n (ω j t k t ) depends only on the triple (i t j t k t ). Note, finally, that an important ingredient of the model described above is that the dynamics of states of nature i ∈ I (where I is the finite set of states of nature) is independent of players' actions. The even more general model, which is not discussed here, enables the transition of states to depend also on players' actions and generalizes not only the theory of repeated games with incomplete information, but also the theory of stochastic games.
Complementary Information
Another important characteristic of the basic model, and of the extensions introduced above, is that all information about future states of nature possessed by the agent is also possessed by the forecaster. One may wish to consider extensions of our models in which both players are partially informed beforehand of the realized sequence of states of nature.
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